This paper studies attackers with control objectives against cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The goal of the attacker is to counteract the CPS's controller and move the system to a target state while evading detection. We formulate a cost function that reflects the attacker's goals, and, using dynamic programming, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate. By changing the parameters of the cost function, we show how an attacker can design optimal attacks to balance the control objective and the detection avoidance objective. Finally, we provide a numerical illustration based on a remotely controlled helicopter under attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper proposes an attack strategy against cyber-physical systems (CPSs). An integrity attacker [1] , [2] with access to a subset of the CPS's actuators and sensors aims to counter the CPS's controller and move the system to a target state while avoiding the CPS's χ 2 attack detector. We define a linear quadratic cost function that penalizes the deviation of the system state from the target state and the energy of the attack detection statistic. Using dynamic programming, we find an attack strategy that balances the attacker's control objective error and the impact of the attack on the detection statistic.
Existing work has focused extensively on developing security countermeasures, such as attack detectors and identifiers [3] - [5] , and studying their limitations [6] - [9] . Papers [1] , [10] , [11] analyze the capability of an integrity attacker to mislead a state estimator while evading a residue detector similar to the χ 2 attack detector. The authors of [12] provide a method to construct undetectable attacks with imperfect knowledge of the CPS's sensing mechanism, and the authors of [13] propose a strategy for an attacker with access to all sensors to maximize the CPS's state estimation error.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TAC.2017.2741778 state estimate. For example, the authors of [1] determine the set of estimation errors an attacker can induce while avoiding detection. This paper, in contrast, assumes that the attacker's goal is to move the CPS to a specific target state and requires a more sophisticated attack strategy than the one proposed in [13] . A preliminary version of our work appears in [14] , where we studied how to attack a CPS that did not have its own controller. Moreover, this paper analyzes how changing the relative costs of control goal and detection avoidance goal affects the performance of the attack, which was not done in [14] . The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the CPS and attacker models, define the attacker's cost function, and formally state the problems we address. Section III details the effect of an attack on the system's attack detector. In Section IV, we solve for the optimal attack sequence using dynamic programming, and we analyze its performance in Section V. We provide a numerical example in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
Notation: Let R denote the reals and R n denote the space of ndimensional real (column) vectors. The multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean μ and covariance Σ is denoted as N (μ, Σ). Let I n be the n by n identity matrix. For a matrix M , R(M ) denotes the range space of M , N (M ) denotes the null space of M , and M † denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse. For a symmetric matrix S = S T , S ( )0 denotes that S is positive definite (semidefinite). For S ∈ R n ×n , S 0, x ∈ R n , let x S = √ x T Sx denote the Sweighted 2-norm of x.
II. BACKGROUND

A. System Model
In the literature on CPS under attack, e.g., [15] , [16] , the CPS often follows a discrete-time state-space model:
where x t ∈ R n is the system state, u t ∈ R m is the system input, e t ∈ R s is the attack , w t ∈ R n is the process noise, y t ∈ R p is the sensor output, and v t ∈ R p is the sensor noise. The process noise w t has independent identical distribution (i.i.d.) N (0, Σ w ) with Σ w 0, the sensor noise v t has (i.i.d.) distribution N (0, Σ v ) with Σ v 0, and w t is independent of v t . The system begins running at t = −∞ from a random initial state x −∞ that has distribution N (x −∞ , Σ x ) with Σ x 0. The initial state x −∞ is independent of w t and v t . The pair (A, C) is observable, and the pair (A, B) is controllable. The matrices Γ and Ψ model the attacker, and without loss of generality, we assume that the matrix Γ Ψ is injective [9] . Model (1) describes linearized dynamics about more complex nonlinear dynamics and are commonly used in the literature, for example, to model power systems [3] , remotely controlled vehicles [14] , and autonomous aircraft [17] . Pa- per [18] describes how to attack automobile's sensors and actuators in practice.
The system knows the matrices A, B, and C, the statistics of x −∞ , w t , v t , and the input u t (for all time t). The system does not know the matrices Γ and Ψ and does not know the attack e t . The CPS is equipped with a Kalman filter to compute a state estimate x t and a stable feedback controller to regulate its internal state, x t , to the origin (i.e., x t ≡ 0). Both the Kalman filter and the controller are designed assuming nominal operating conditions (i.e., e t = 0 for all t). We assume the system starts running at t = −∞, so the Kalman filter converges to a fixed Kalman gain:
where
where ν t = y t − C x t |t −1 is the Kalman innovation and reports that an attack has occurred if g t exceeds a predetermined threshold τ . 1 Under [20] .
B. Attacker Model
Without loss of generality, let the attack begin at time t = 0 (i.e., e t ≡ 0 for all t < 0) and last over a fixed time window until t = N . The attacker causally knows y t for all times t and, for time t = 0 to time t = N , also causally knows y t = Cx t + v t . The attacker knows the system model (1) and, from its knowledge of the system model, can causally compute the system's state estimate x t and the system control input L x t . 2 The attacker's information set, I t , follows the classical information pattern [20] :
Using the information set I t , the attacker runs its own Kalman filter to compute a state estimate x t :
The attacker's state estimate differs from the CPS's state estimate when e t = 0 for some t. An attack sequence e 0 , . . . , e t induces a bias t , to be specified in the following, in the innovation sequence. That is, ν t = ν 0 t + t , where ν 0 t is the system's innovation if there had been no attack (e 0 = . . . = e t = 0). Define the detection statistic cost J d and the control error cost J c as
where Q t , R t 0 are chosen by the attacker to reflect his or her own goals and x * is the desired (constant) target state. Ideally, the attacker 1 We will consider attacks against more sophisticated attack detectors (e.g., [3] , [4] ) in future work. 2 Although the attacker having perfect system knowledge is a strong assumption, in future work, we will study countermeasures against such attackers. Thus, we consider the worst-case (i.e., most powerful) attacker. Future work will also include studying attack strategies for attackers with imperfect system knowledge.
wishes to minimize J c subject to the constraint that g t ≤ τ for all t. Due to the noise processes w t and v t , it is, however, impossible to satisfy g t ≤ τ with probability 1 unless one makes the strong assumption that the attacker can manipulate all of the sensors. 3 The attacker may also seek to minimize J c subject to a constraint on J d (e.g., J d ≤ δ for some δ > 0). In general, there is not a closed-form solution for such a problem. In this paper, we consider the cost function J = J c + J d , determine the optimal cost
and find the optimal attack strategy e 0 , . . . , e N in closed form. The attacker chooses the matrices Q t and R t ,à priori, to reflect his or her own goals, and for any choice, we find the optimal attack. For example, an aggressive attacker who cares more about the control objective would choose a "larger" Q t , while a conservative attacker who cares more about avoiding detection would choose a "larger" R t . For the purpose of analysis, only, we find the optimal attack for the cost function J α = αJ c + J d , where α ≥ 0 is a weighting parameter, and determine how the relative weighting between the two cost function components affects the optimal J c and J d . Using the parameter α provides more interpretable analysis than directly choosing different Q t and R t matrices.
III. ATTACK EFFECT
We calculate the effect of an attack sequence on the system's Kalman filter, its feedback controller, and the χ 2 attack detector. Let t be the induced bias in ν t (ν t = ν 0 t + t ), and let ω t + 1 be in the induced bias in x t ( x t = x 0 t + ω t + 1 , where x 0 t is the CPS's estimate had there been no attack). In terms of ω t + 1 , the system's input becomes u t = L ( x 0 t + ω t + 1 ). From algebraic manipulation on the output of system (1), the sensor measurement at time t under attack is
where γ t = t −1 j = 0 CA t −1 −j BLω j + 1 and β t = Ψe t + t −1 j = 0 CA t −1 −j Γe j , and y 0 t is the sensor output under no attack. By inspection, we can treat γ t and β t as the outputs of state-space dynamical systems. Defining the virtual state variables π t , ρ t ∈ R n , we see that γ t is the output to the dynamical system
with π 0 = 0, and β t is the output to the dynamical system
with ρ 0 = 0. From the definition of ω t + 1 and the Kalman filter equations, we can show, after algebraic manipulation, that
, which means that ω t is the output of the dynamical system
Through further algebraic manipulation, we can show that t = −C(A + BL)ω t + γ t + β t , which means that the relationship between the attack sequence and t is described by the interconnection of P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 shown in Fig. 1 . We summarize the effect of the attack on the CPS using the virtual state θ t = ω T t π T t ρ T t T and the dynamical system
and θ 0 = 0.
IV. OPTIMAL ATTACK STRATEGY
We find an attack sequence e 0 , . . . , e N that minimizes the cost function J . Define
Let ν t = y t − C x t be the attacker's innovation. Furthermore, define the following matrices:
Theorem 1 (Optimal Attack Strategy): An attack sequence e 0 , . . . , e N that minimizes J is
for t = 0, . . . , N − 1. The matrix Q t is given recursively backward in time by
with terminal condition
Corollary 1: If Q t and R t are positive definite for all t = 0, . . . , N , then the optimal cost J * exists, and for t = 0, . . . , N − 1, the optimal attack e t is unique.
Theorem 1 states that the optimal attack strategy is a linear feedback of x t , θ t , ν t , x * , and x 0 t . 4 Lemma 1: Given I t , the attacker can perfectly obtain the values of x t , θ t , ν t , and x 0 t . Lemma 1 states that the attack from Theorem 1 only depends on I t . Proofs of all lemmas may be found in the Appendix.
The proof of Theorem 1 requires the following intermediate results. (18) and (19)] is positive semidefinite for all t = N, N − 1, . . . , 0. Moreover, for t = N − 1, . . . , 0, the matrix Q t follows the backward recursive relationship
Lemma 4: For all ξ N ∈ R 6 n and for all ν N ∈ R p ,
Lemma 5: The attacker's innovation ν t , satisfies ν t = ν 0 t . We can express J c in terms of x t . Let n t be the attacker's estimation error (x t = x t + n t ). Conditioned on the attacker's information, I t , n t is i.i.d. N 0, P , where P = P − P C T Σ −1 ν CP , and is orthogonal to x t . The cost function J c becomes
We find the optimal attack strategy by finding inf e 0 ,...,e N J c + J d . Note that (23) establishes the separation of estimation and attack, similar to the separation of estimation and control in standard linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) optimal control [20] . 5 The attack e t does not affect the attacker's Kalman filter. Let J = J c + J d = E N t = 0 ζ t 2 F t . Applying Lemma 5 and performing algebraic manipulations, we have
(24)
Proof (Theorem 1): We resort to dynamic programming. Define J * t to be the optimal return function at time t for information I t . We begin with t = N :
Substituting equation for ζ N and setting the first derivative (with respect to e N ) of the right-hand side of (25) equal to 0, we have that the op- [21] , which was shown in Lemma 4. Then, an optimal e N is
Substituting (26) into (25), we find, after algebraic manipulation,
and Π N = 0.
Following dynamic programming, we proceed to t = N − 1:
Define ξ N −1 = Aξ N −1 + Be N −1 . After substitution of (24) and the Kalman filter equations into (27) and performing algebraic manipulation, we have E J *
Then, the optimal e N −1 is given by
Note that a sufficient condition for the existence of a minimizing e N −1 is the positive definiteness of D T F N −1 D + B T Q N B [21] , which was shown in Lemma 3. We substitute (33) into (32) and perform algebraic manipulations so that J * N −1 is expressed in the form
We find the recurrence relations for the matrices in the above equation by grouping together the appropriate terms of J * N −1 . The matrix Q N −1 follows the recursion
where Q N was defined in (28). The matrix R N −1 follows
The matrix S N −1 follows
The dynamic programming procedure for t = N − 2, . . . , 0 follows the same procedure for t = N − 1.
The optimal cost is J * = E[J * 0 ] + N t = 0 trace( P Q t ) and can be expressed in terms of the (unconditional) statistics of x 0 |−1 , the attacker's estimate of x 0 at time −1 [20] . The quantity x 0 |−1 is (unconditionally) distributed as N (x 0 , Σ 0 ). Since A + BL is stable by definition, from the system model and (attacker) Kalman filter equations, we have
and Σ 0 is the unique solution to the equation 
V. WEIGHTED COST FUNCTION PERFORMANCE
This section studies the effect of the relative weighting between J c and J d on the performance of the optimal attack. Consider the modified cost function J α = αJ c + J d . Theorem 1 gives the sequence of attacks e 0 , . . . , e N that minimizes J α , which has the general form
We study how the attacker's choice of α affects the values of J d and J c , and we analyze the asymptotic behavior of J d and J c as alpha approaches 0 and ∞, respectively.
A. α-Weighted Performance
Let J α ,d and J α ,c be the values of J d and J c when the attack is e α ,t . Theorem 2 (α-Weighted Performance): Let e 0 , . . . , e N be the sequence of attacks that minimizes J α given by (41). Then, the detection statistic cost, J α ,d , and the normalized control error cost, J α ,c , are given as
The matrices Q α ,t and Q α ,t are given by the recursive relations
with terminal conditions Q α ,N + 1 = Q α ,N + 1 = 0. The matrices R α ,t , S α ,t , R α ,t , and S α ,t are given as
Proof (Theorem 2): We derive (43), the expression for J α ,c . The derivation of the expression for J α ,d follows similarly. From (23),
We evaluate J α ,c recursively backward in time. Define J α ,c,t to be the cost-to-go function for J α ,c when the attack is e α ,t and the attacker's information is I t . For time t = N , for which we have J α ,c,N = H T ξ N 2 Q N , which can be rearranged to
, and Π N = 0. Proceeding to t = N − 1, we have, following (41), that the attack is e α ,N −
Substituting ξ α ,N −1 = Aξ N −1 + Be α ,N −1 into (50) and evaluating the conditional expectation, we have
Substituting for e α ,N −1 into (51) and performing algebraic manipulations so that J α ,c,N −1 has the form Using Theorem 2, the attacker can compute J α ,d and J α ,c , and the attacker can determine how the relative weighting parameter α affects the performance of the attack.
B. Asymptotic Weighting Performance
In this subsection, we consider the detection statistic cost and control error cost incurred by the attack sequence minimizing J α as α approaches 0 and as α approaches ∞. Let
and let J 0 ,c and J ∞,c be defined similarly. In order to compute these quantities, we need to compute e 0 ,t and e ∞,t , the attack sequences that minimize J d and J c , respectively. We cannot use Theorem 1 to find e 0 ,t and e ∞,t -Theorem 1 presupposes that Q t , R t 0, which is not the case when we minimize J d and J c . Theorem 3 (Asymptotically Weighted Optimal Attacks): For α = 0 and α = ∞, the optimal attack strategy has the form
For α = 0, and for t = 0, . . . , N , the matrices L 0 ,t and O 0 ,t follow
where V t follows the recursion
with V N + 1 = 0. For α = ∞, and for t = 0, . . . , N , the matrices L ∞,t and O 0 ,t follow
where W t follows the recursion
with W N + 1 = 0. The proof of Theorem 3 requires the following lemma.
Proof (Theorem 3):
We consider the case of α = ∞ and find the sequence of attacks that solves J * ∞,c = inf e 0 ,...,e N J c . Recall that J c = J c + N t = 0 trace P Q and resort to dynamic programming to find the minimizing attack sequence. Define J * ∞,c ,t to be the optimal return function at time t for infor-
where W N = H T Q N H, andΠ N = 0. Note that, at time t = N , the attack e N does not affect the optimal return function, so we let e N = 0.
whereΠ N −1 =Π N + trace Σ ν K T W N K . From (63), we have that e ∞,N −1 is given by
A sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal e ∞,N −1 is
, which is satisfied according to Lemma 6. The optimal return function is
The procedure for t = N − 2, . . . , 0 follows similarly to the procedure for t = N − 1.
Theorem 3 provides expressions for the optimal attack sequence when the weighting parameter α is either 0 or ∞. Combining the results of Theorem 3 with the results of Theorem 2, we find expressions for J 0 ,d , J ∞,d , J 0 ,c , and J ∞,c .
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We demonstrate the attack strategy using a numerical example of a remotely controlled helicopter under attack; a 10-state model may be found in [17] . Due to space constraints, we provide only a brief description of the attacker and refer the reader to the extended version of this work for more details [22] . The attacker wishes to move two of the helicopters' states (vertical and lateral velocity) to a new target state, and chooses a Q t matrix for J c that penalizes the deviation of these states. The attacker chooses R t = Σ −1 ν for J d . Under no attack, the statistic g t is χ 2 distributed with ten degrees of freedom. Figs. 2 and 3 show that our proposed attack strategy successfully moves CPS's state to the target state while evading detection. The attacker may use the weighting parameter α to change the performance of the optimal α-weighted attack. As Fig. 4 demonstrates, for low values of α, the optimal attack yields a low J d (corresponding to better detection evasion) and, for high values of α, the optimal attack yields a low J c (corresponding to better control).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied an attack strategy against a CPS, in which an attacker wishes to move the system to a target state while avoiding the system's χ 2 attack detector. We have formulated a quadratic cost function that captures the attacker's objectives; the cost function is the sum of components penalizing the distance from the target state and the energy of the system's detection statistic, respectively. Using dynamic programming, we have found an optimal sequence of attacks, which is a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate, that minimizes this cost function. Moreover, we have derived expressions for the control error component and the detection statistic component of the cost as a function of a cost weighting parameter chosen by the attacker. Finally, we have provided a numerical example that demonstrates the attack strategy and have shown a tradeoff between control performance and detection avoidance.
APPENDIX
Proof (Lemma 1): By definition, we have x t = E [x t |I t ], so x t can be perfectly obtained from I t . Similarly,, we have ν t = y t − CE [x t −1 | {I t −1 , e t −1 }], which means that ν t can be perfectly obtained from {I t −1 , e t −1 , y t } = I t . From the dynamical system in (14) , we know that θ t = A t θ 0 + t −1 j = 0 A t −1 −j Be j , where θ 0 = 0. From (5), we have {e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e t −1 } ⊂ I t , so the information set I t exactly determines θ t .
The attacker can also run a Kalman filter while ignoring the input e t and compute x t , the estimate produced by the system's Kalman filter. Substituting x t = x 0 t + ω t + 1 and (14) into the Kalman filtering equations, we have, after algebraic manipulation,
where x t −1 is exactly determined given I t . In addition, we have y t ∈ I t . By (67), the information set I t exactly determines x 0 t . The proof of Lemma 3 requires the following lemma. Proof (Lemma 2): We resort to induction. In the base case, we show that Q N 0. By algebraic manipulation on (19), we have
By definition, F N 0, which means that, by (68), Q N 0. In the induction step, we assume that Q t + 1 0 and show that Q t 0. The equation
follows from algebraic manipulation of (18) . By definition, F t 0, and by the induction hypothesis, Q t + 1 0. Thus, by (69), Q t 0.
Proof (Lemma 3):
We resort to induction. In the base case, we show that D T F N −1 D + B T Q N B is positive definite. We first show that there exists T N 0 such that Q N = H T Q N H + T N . From the structure of C and F t , we have, for all t = 0, . . . , N , (19) yields, after algebraic manipulation,
Proceeding, we note that B T H T = (Γ + BLKΨ) T 0 0 0 , which means that, for all t = 0, . . . , N ,
Then, substituting for (70), Q N , B, D, and F N −1 , we have
where B = (Γ + BLKΨ) T Ψ T T . We now show that B has full column rank. By contradiction, suppose it does not have full column rank. Then, ∃μ = 0 such that
Equation (72) implies that, for some μ = 0, Γ T Ψ T T μ = 0, which contradicts the assumption that Γ T Ψ T T has full column rank. Since B has full column rank, F N −1 0 (by definition), and T N 0, (70)
In the induction step, we assume that
Substituting for C T F t C into (69) yields, after algebraic manipulation,
By Lemma 2, Q t + 1 0 for t = N − 1, . . . , 0, and by definition,
Then, substituting for (70), Q t , B, D, and F t −1 , we have
Let μ ∈ N Ψ T R N Ψ , and by contradiction, suppose μ / ∈ N (R N Ψ). Then, R N Ψμ = 0, which means that Ψμ = 0. Since R N 0 and Ψμ = 0, we have μ T Ψ T R N Ψμ = 0, which means that Ψ T R N Ψμ = 0. This is a contradiction since μ ∈ N Ψ T R N Ψ . Thus, we have N Ψ T R N Ψ ⊆ N (R N Ψ). For any matrix M , N (M ) = R ⊥ M T , where R ⊥ denotes the orthogonal range space of a matrix. Thus, we have R ⊥ D T F N D ⊆ R ⊥ D T F N , which means that R D T F N ⊆ R D T F N D . By construction, D T F N (Cξ N + Mν N ) belongs to R D T F N , so it must also belong to R D T F N D .
Proof (Lemma 5): From (7), we have that the attacker's innovation is ν t = y t − C (A x t −1 + BL ( x 0 t −1 + ω t ) + Γe t −1 ). By definition, the system's innovation when there is no attack is ν 0 t = y 0 t − C (A x 0 t −1 + BL x 0 t −1 ). We compute y t using the system in (1):
From the Kalman filtering equations for both the system and the attacker, we have x 0 t −1 = A t −1 x 0 0 + t −2 j = 0 A t −2 −j (BL x 0 j + Kν 0 j + 1 ), and x t −1 = A t −1 x 0 + t −2 j = 0 A t −2 −j (BL x 0 j + ω j + 1 + K ν j + 1 + Γe j ). The attack e 0 does not affect the internal state of the system x 0 , and the attacker Kalman filter uses y 0 to compute x 0 . Since y 0 is not affected by the attack e 0 (i.e., y 0 = y 0 0 ), we have x 0 = x 0 0 , which means that
and that ν 0 = ν 0 0 . Substituting (75) and (76) into the expression for ν t yields, after algebraic manipulation,
We now resort to induction to show that ν t = ν 0 t . In the base case, we have already shown that ν 0 = ν 0 0 . In the induction step, we assume that ν j = ν 0 j for j = 0, . . . , t − 1. Then, by (77), we have ν t = ν 0 t .
Proof (Lemma 6): First, we resort to induction to show that W t 0 for t = 0, . . . , N + 1. We resort to induction. In the base case, we have W N + 1 = 0 0. In the induction step, we assume that W t + 1 0 and show that W t 0. By (60), we have, after algebraic manipulation,
Since Q t 0 by definition and W t + 1 0 by the induction hypothesis, we have W t 0.
We now show N (B T W t + 1 B) ⊆ N (W t + 1 B). Let μ ∈ N (B T W t + 1 B). Then, we have μ T B T W t + 1 Bμ = W 1 2 t + 1 Bμ 2 2 = 0. From the nonnegativity of norms, we then have W 1 2 t + 1 Bμ = 0, which means W t + 1 Bμ = 0 and μ ∈ N (W t + 1 B) . For any matrix M , N (M ) = R ⊥ (M T ), where R ⊥ denotes the orthogonal space of a matrix. Thus, we have R ⊥ (B T W t + 1 B) ⊆ R ⊥ (B T W t + 1 ), which means that R(B T W t + 1 ) ⊆ R(B T W t + 1 B). By construction, for any ξ t ∈ R 6 n , B T W t + 1 Aξ t ∈ R(B T W t + 1 ), so we have B T W t + 1 Aξ t ∈ R(B T W t + 1 B).
